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In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,' the United States Supreme Court
invalidated every death penalty statute in the United States. Furman
was decided by a five to four margin and each justice wrote a separate
opinion. Only two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, rejected capital
punishment asperse unconstitutional. 2 In support of the eighth amend-
ment challenge, the remaining three Justices of the majority, Douglas,
Stewart and White, held that the statutoryprocesses by which defendants
were being sentenced to death were unconstitutional. 3 In his opinion,
Justice Douglas noted the possibility of discrimination in existing capital
punishment statutes, anchoring his objection to an implied equal pro-
tection component of the eighth amendment. 4 Justice Stewart, how-
ever, held that the death penalty as currently practiced was
unconstitutional because of the capricious manner in which those who
receive the death penalty were selected. Noting that there are many
more "reprehensible" offenders than those sentenced to death, Justice
Stewart concluded that those given death sentences "are among a capri-
ciously selected random handful" and that therefore "death sentences
* Assistant Professor, Institute for Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of
Maryland. Ph.D., Florida State University, 1978; M.S., Southern Illinois University, 1975;
B.A., University of Delaware, 1973.
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of numerous people without whose
herculean efforts this project never would have existed. The research staffofSoozie Caulfield,
June Skinner, Tim Walker and Diana Gamble spent long and unpaid hours compiling, cod-
ing and editing the data. Were it not for the efforts and legal skills of David Bruck of the
South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, the data would not have been secured.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313
(White, J., concurring).
4 Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual."' 5 In his separate concurring opinion, Justice White
emphasized the infrequent imposition of the death penalty and held
that the special nature of the penalty requires a meaningful basis for
separating capital and noncapital cases.
6
Thus, the plurality's holding in the Furman decision was that the
process of death sentencing was unconstitutional, not the result. With
only two Justices adopting a per se position in rejecting capital punish-
ment, the composite message of Furman was that state legislators could
draft a death penalty statute without the constitutional infirmities found
by Justices Stewart, Douglas and White. But the task of drafting a
death penalty statute which met the objections raised in Furman would
not be an easy task. Although each Justice wrote a separate concurring
opinion, these opinions are brief and not well-supported with detailed
analyses. Despite the individual nature of the objections and the lack of
detail in support of those objections, the common theme in Justice
Douglas, Stewart and White's opinions was that existing statutes pro-
vided no standards for sentencers in determining who should receive the
death penalty: "Under these laws no standards govern the selection of
the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or
12."17 The decisive objection in these opinions was that sentencers had
too much discretion resulting in a pattern of application that was char-
acterized as "capricious," "freakishly rare" and "uneven.",, In his dis-
senting opinion, Chief Justice Burger suggested that the constitutional
infirmities of death penalty statutes found in Furman could be remedied
if the untrammeled discretion of sentencers was restricted:
Since the two pivotal concurring opinions turn on the assumption that the
punishment of death is now meted out in a random and unpredictable
manner, legislative bodies may seek to bring their laws into compliance
with the Court's ruling by providing standards for juries and judges to
follow in determining the sentence in capital cases or by more narrowly
defining the crimes for which the penalty is to be imposed. If such stan-
dards can be devised or the crimes more meticulously defined, the result
cannot be detrimental. 9
In sum, Furman held that where a sentencer is provided with discre-
tion in a matter so important and irrevocable as the death penalty, that
discretion must be structured in some way so as to avoid the capricious
and wanton imposition of capital punishment. After the Furman deci-
sion, state legislators attempted to meet the Court's objections by plac-
5 Id. at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 310-13 (White, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 253.
8 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 400-01 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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ing restrictions on sentencing discretion. These restrictions took the
form of either mandatory death penalty statutes or guided discretion
statutes. In mandatory death penalty statutes, sentencing discretion was
to be restricted by having death as the mandatory penalty upon the
conviction of a narrowly defined class of crimes. Guided discretion stat-
utes were designed to structure, not eliminate, sentencing discretion by
providing articulated standards for the sentencing decision. Typically,
this has taken the form of enumerated statutory aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances which must be considered before a sentence of
death may be imposed.
These revised death sentencing schemes were reviewed by the
Supreme Court in the 1975 term. In three cases- Gregg v. Georgia,'°Jurek
v. Texas, I I and Proffitt v. Florida 12-the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of guided discretion statutes. The Court struck down mandatory
death penalty statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina1 3 and Roberts v.
Louisiana. 14
In endorsing the guided discretion structure of capital sentencing,
the Court in Gregg and its companion cases noted that under these
schemes arbitrariness and capriciousness would be eliminated by di-
recting the attention of sentencers to specified characteristics of the of-
fense and offender.' 5 Further protections to capital defendants would be
afforded under these statutes by automatic appellate review which
would ensure that death penalties were being implemented rationally
and evenhandedly. 16 Mandatory death penalty statutes, however, were
rejected because they would not structure discretion nor would appel-
late review hold the promise of correcting errors in the imposition of
death sentences.1 7 By not providing specific guidelines for sentencers in
their deliberations, the Court in Woodson noted that "mandatory stat-
utes enacted in response to Furman have simply papered over the prob-
lem of unguided and unchecked jury discretion."' 8 Furthermore, the
Court noted the historical tendency of jury nullification under
mandatory capital punishment procedures. In commenting on the
North Carolina scheme, the Court explained:
10 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
11 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
12 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
13 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
14 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
15 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, J.J.).
16 Id.
17 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334-36 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.).
18 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302.
[Vol. 74
1983] RACE OF VICTIM AND LOCATION OF CRIME 757
[The] mandatory death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the
jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree
murderers shall live and which shall die. And there is no way under the
North Carolina law for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious ex-
ercise of that power through a review of death sentences.19
The Court's decision in Woodson makes it clear that the fatal flaw of
mandatory death penalty statutes is that without specific standards the
process of deciding who is to be sentenced to death is shielded from judi-
cial review, making appellate level correction impossible. The critical
nature of this fatal infirmity becomes even more clear when one consid-
ers the central role the Supreme Court gives appellate review of death
sentences in ensuring consistency in capital sentencing. As revealed by
the comments of Justice Stewart, the Court assumed that the process of
appellate review would be the linchpin in curing the new statute of con-
stitutional infirmities: "[T]o guard further against a situation compara-
ble to that presented in Furman, the Supreme Court of Georgia compares
each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated
defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is
not disproportionate." 20 Furthermore, in Proit, three Justices contended
that sentencing standards would restrict arbitrary and capricious jury
behavior and that "to the extent that any risk to the contrary exists, it is
minimized by Florida's appellate review system."'2 ' Finally, the impor-
tance of appellate review can be seen in Woodson and Roberts where
mandatory death penalty processes were struck down in part because
"there is no meaningful appellate review of the jury's decision. ' 22
While it is true that the Court has neither imposed any model of
appellate review on the states nor made appellate review of death
sentences a constitutional necessity, it considers some form of review an
essential "check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty. '23 Appellate review is to act as the "ultimate supervisor of the
19 Id. at 303.
20 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
21 Proffi, 428 U.S. at 253 (Powell, J., announcing plurality opinion).
22 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335-36 (Stewart, J., announcing plurality opinion); Woodson, 428
U.S. at 303 (Stewart, J., announcing plurality opinion). In both Woodson and Roberts Justice
Stewart rejected mandatory death sentences under a theory that gives appellate courts a cen-
tral role in ensuring that death statutes meet constitutional requirements. See Palmer, Two
Perspectives on Structuring Discretion: Justices Stewart and White on the Death Penall, 70 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 194, 196-97 (1979). In rejecting the North Carolina law, Justice Stewart
held that by failing to provide a separate process of appellate review the statute "does not
fulfill Furman's basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with ob-
jective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for impos-
ing a sentence of death." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. More generally, appellate review of the
death sentencing process is probably a minimal condition for the constitutionality of death
penalty statutes under Justice Stewart's analysis. See Palmer, supra, at 196-97.
23 Gregg, 408 U.S. at 206.
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administration of the death penalty," 24 ensuring that death sentences
are not imposed because of passion or prejudice; that they are propor-
tionate; and that they are consistently and evenhandedly imposed. The
Court has further demonstrated that where "meaningful review" of
death sentences is rendered impossible, as in a mandatory sentencing
scheme, it will not be confident that the possibility of arbitrary and ca-
pricious application of the penalty will be removed and will therefore
invalidate it.25
The decision to convict for first-degree murder under a mandatory
death sentence is, of course, only one instance of a low visibility decision
which may be pregnant with capriciousness and discrimination. Such
low visibility decision points may exist within constitutionally approved
guided discretion statutes as well, and their low visibility will shield
them from all but the most rigorous appellate review. One such deci-
sion point in the guided discretion process of capital sentencing is the
decision of the prosecutor to seek the death penalty in a given homicide.
Although in any one year there are hundreds of homicides committed in
a death penalty state which could be considered by statute a capital
murder, in only a small proportion of those cases is the death penalty
requested.2 6 The decision to seek a death sentence is a charging decision
within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor. Numerous factors go into this
decision, some of which are legally relevant, such as the number of vic-
tims killed, the aggravated nature of the homicide or the vulnerability of
the victim. Other factors, however, may enter into this decison, such as
the race of the victim or the offender, or the location within the state
where the homicide occurred. If the decision to charge-or not to
charge-a homicide as a capital crime is discriminatorily or arbitrarily
made, 27 there is little possibility for correction by appellate review under
24 Palmer, supra note 22, at 197.
25 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335.
26 For example, in South Carolina, from the time the new death penalty statute was en-
acted on June 8, 1977 until December 31, 1977, death was requested in only 115 of a total of
1686 (7%) death eligible non-negligent homicides. See icfa text accompanying note 46.
27 This conceptualization of discrimination and arbitrariness draws upon Bowers and
Pierce's earlier analysis of post-Furman capital sentencing statutes. See Bowers & Pierce, Arbi-
trariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 572
(1980). They give a general meaning to arbitrariness as referring to "any departure from the
retributive model requiring death as punishment to be strictly a function of statutory guide-
lines and evolving standards of practice." Id. at 572-73. Discrimination is a type of arbitrari-
ness which occurs when the departure from the retributive model is produced by systematic
extralegal influences such as the race of the offender, the race of the victim, or the size of the
community where the homicide occurred. Although Bowers and Pierce refer to the first influ-
ence as discrimination and the second two influences as disparity (a form of discrimination),
see id. at 574, in this Article all legally irrelevant characteristics of the crime, victim, or of-
fender will be referred to as a kind of discrimination. Arbitrariness will refer to geographical
variation.
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current review practices.
In conducting their proportionality review to see if the penalty of
death in a given case is proportionate to the penalty given in "similar
cases," state supreme courts have restricted the universe of "similar
cases" to those cases involving appealed death and life imprisonment
sentences. 28 Importantly, such a restricted definition of similar cases ex-
cludes both unappealed capital convictions where life imprisonment is
imposed and homicides which could have been charged as capital homi-
28 The Supreme Court has noted that effective appellate review should involve the com-
parison of particular sentences with those sentences in factually similar cases. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 198; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 256-59. The Justices have not, how-
ever, stated any parameters as to the comprehensiveness of the proportionality review. On
the one hand, Justice Stewart in Gregg alludes to an expansive universe of similar cases, noting
that the process of proportionality review should be so thorough that each death sentence is
compared with 'similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204
(emphasis added) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. §27-2537(c)(3) (Supp. 1975) (current version at
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35 (1982). In a later footnote, however, Justice Stewart dismisses the peti-
tioner's claim that the Georgia Supreme Court's practice ofexcluding from its proportionality
review un-appealed life sentences and cases where a capital conviction was not obtained in-
validates its review process. While he noted that the state supreme court does not have to
include such cases in its universe of similar cases, Justice Stewart stated that it may do so of its
own accord, and as normal practice does include appealed life sentences in its review. Id. at
204 n.56.
In describing the required proportionality review, the South Carolina capital punish-
ment statute uses language almost identical to that of the Georgia statute commented upon
by Justice Stewart in Gregg. The statute provides that in reviewing for error the Supreme
Court of South Carolina shall determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances. . . and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty im-
posed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982). The requirements for determining if
the sentence was influenced by prejudice and not disproportionate to factually similar cases
seem to demand a broad universe of cases and an expansive process of appellate review.
In a recent case affirming a death sentence, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court
substantially restricted the range of its proportionality review. State v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63
(S.C. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1802 (1983). In comparing a particular death sentence with
the sentences imposed in other similar cases, the court defined the universe of similar cases as
those where a sentence of death was imposed and affirmed on appeal. 300 S.E. 2d at 74-75.
At the time of the Copeland decision, approximately six years after the effective date of the
capital punishment statute, there were five such cases making up the total universe of similar
cases for the South Carolina proportionality review. Rather than compare a case where a
death sentence was imposed with the large number of cases involving "similar cases consider-
ing both the crime and the defendant," the state supreme court compared it with other af-
firmed death cases. Not surprisingly, in affirming a particular death sentence the South
Carolina Supreme Court found no other truly similar cases with which to compare it and
subsequently decided that, given the crime and the defendant, it was neither excessive nor
disproportionate. For a critique of this form of proportionality review, see Hubbard, Burry &
Widener, A "Meaningfl" Basis for the Death Penalty: The Practice, Constitutionality, and Justice of
Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 34 S.C.L. REv. 391 (1982).
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cides but were not. If arbitrariness and discrimination afflict the charg-
ing decision, such low visibility practices will go unnoticed and
uncorrected at the appellate level. This is precisely the process of capital
punishment administration rejected by the Supreme Court in Woodson
and Roberts.
Although the Court's attention in Gregg and its companion cases
was directed at the sentencing stage of capital cases, it was not immune
to the possibility that even with sentencing standards discrimination
could be displaced to other points in the system, such as when the prose-
cutor charges the case. Petitioner Gregg indeed did contend that the
post-Furman changes in the Georgia death statute were merely "cos-
metic" and that unbridled discretion continued to be given state prose-
cutors.2 9 In his concurring opinion, Justice White directly examined the
possibility that prosecutors' behavior under guided discretion statutes
might be arbitrary and standardless. He concluded (without "facts")
30
that the "[p]etitioner's argument that prosecutors behave in a standard-
less fashion in deciding which cases to try as capital felonies is unsup-
ported by any facts." 31 In explicating what would restrain prosecutors
from behaving in a "standardless" manner and what effect it would
have on the review process, Justice White suggested that it would be the
same guidelines which structure the discretion of the sentencing jury:
Unless prosecutors are incompetent in their judgments, the standards by
which they decide whether to charge a capital felony will be the same as
those by which the jury will decide the questions of guilt and sentence
.... Thus the prosecutor's charging decisions are unlikely to have re-
moved from the sample of cases considered by the Georgia Supreme Court
any which are truly "similar." If the cases really were "similar" in relevant
respects, it is unlikely that prosecutors would fail to prosecute them as cap-
ital cases .... 32
In deciding to charge or not to charge a homicide as a capital homicide,
Justice White assumed that sentencing guidelines will filter down and
restrict the discretion of the prosecutor. Prosecutors will decide to seek
the death penalty only in those cases where the composite of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances warrant it. In such a model, homicide
cases where a death sentence was not sought could be presumed to be
less serious than those cases where it was requested, thereby leaving un-
affected the universe of similar cases for "meaningful appellate
review."33
Whether the prosecutor's charging discretion is structured by statu-
29 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
30 Id. at 225.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335.
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tory standards rather than by discrimination and arbitrariness is a ques-
tion that can only be answered by empirical rather than legal analysis.
The data collected to date does not provide much support for Justice
White's confidence in the "competence" of prosecutors. In their study of
a sample of Florida cases, Bowers and Pierce found that the probability
of a first-degree murder indictment given a homicide charge was sub-
stantially greater in cases involving black offenders and white victims.
34
They also reported that the decision to charge an accompanying felony
with the homicide (making the defendant eligible for the death penalty)
was related to both the race of victim and the race of offender.35 Bowers
and Pierce also found that the probability that a first degree murder
indictment would be returned given a homicide charge varied substan-
tially between different areas in the state.3 6 Evidence of arbitrariness in
the charging of homicide cases was found for both felony and non-felony
homicides. 37 Using data from selected Florida counties and focusing on
homicides between strangers, Radelet found that murderers of whites
were significantly more likely to be indicted for first-degree murder than
were killers of blacks. 38 Unlike Bowers and Pierce, however, Radelet
found no evidence of discrimination by race of offender once the vic-
tim's race was controlled.3 9 Evidence of prosecutors' discriminatory be-
havior in their decision to seek death sentences also was found in South
Carolina. Jacoby and Paternoster reported that the probability of a
death sentence being sought was three times higher for those who killed
whites than for those who killed blacks.40 The prosecutor was four times
as likely to request the death penalty in cases involving a black defend-
ant and a white victim than in those involving black victims.
4 t
The available empirical evidence about the behavior of prosecutors
in their charging decisions suggests that arbitrariness and discrimination
have not been removed from the capital sentencing process by post-
Furman reforms. These findings, however, cannot be taken as unequivo-
cal proof. As Bowers and Pierce have noted, evidence of differential
treatment by race may reflect discrimination or it could "be the result of
legally relevant differences in the kinds of crimes committed by and
34 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 27, at 610.
35 Id. at 613. This is my definition of discrimination. See supra note 27.
36 This is my definition of arbitrariness. See supra note 27.
37 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 27, at 616-19.
38 Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv.
918, 922-23 (1981).
39 Id.
40 Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity andjuy Packing: Further Challenges to the Death
Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 384 (1982).
41 Id. at 384-85.
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against blacks and whites."'42 To control for this possibility, they con-
ducted separate analyses of felony-homicides (homicides committed in
the course of an accompanying felony) and non-felony homicides.43 In
his analysis, Radelet controlled for the relationship between victim and
offender and type of homicide (first-degree murder).44 Jacoby and Pa-
ternoster controlled for legally relevant differences by studying only
those homicides which included at least one statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance, thus making them all minimally "death eligible. '45 Al-
though such efforts do offer some control over legally relevant
differences in the kinds of homicides committed, only a few of the many
possible legally relevant differences have been controlled. Nor has there
been any attempt to control simultaneously for several possible factors.
The data presented in this Article is an attempt to refine the analy-
sis of arbitrariness and discrimination in the charging of homicide cases.
This study reports on the charging decisions made by local prosecutors
in the state of South Carolina in the approximately 1,800 homicides
committed from the time the new death penalty statute took effect on
June 8, 1977 until December 31, 1981. The data will be used to test
both a discrimination and an arbitrariness hypothesis in the charging of
homicide cases. The analysis will try to account for the prosecutor's de-
cision to seek the death penalty in a given case of homicide in terms of
both legally relevant characteristics of the offense and offender, and le-
gally irrelevant characteristics of the offender and victim. In addition,
this Article presents data on the geographical variation of death requests
by prosecutors throughout the state, and the relationship between that
variation and differences in the characteristics of homicides committed
in those geographical regions.
II. METHODS
A. DATA SOURCES
The unit of analysis in this research is the homicide act. A homicide
act is defined as a distinct act of homicide committed by a single of-
fender against one or more victims. If, for example, two offenders were
to kill one victim there would be two acts of homicide, one for each
offender. If one offender were to kill two victims there would be a single
homicide, but one more serious than a homicide with only one victim.
Between June 8, 1977, the effective date of the new death penalty stat-
ute, and December 31, 1981, there were 1,805 non-negligent homicide
42 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 27, at 597.
43 Id.
44 Radelet, supra note 38.
45 Jacoby & Paternoster, supra note 40.
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acts committed in South Carolina.46 One hundred and nineteen of
these cases (6.6%) were eliminated because there was no known offender.
The remaining 1,686 cases constitute the first pool of homicide cases
which are eligible for the death penalty.
Information on this pool of homicide cases was collected from three
sources. An initial file was created from the data contained in the Sup-
plemental Homicide Report (SHR). The SHR's are filled out by local
police agencies and are submitted to the South Carolina State Law En-
forcement Division (SLED) which codes and compiles the reports and
forwards the data to the FBI's Uniform Crime Report Program.
4 7
SHR's were obtained for the years 1977 through 1981, and homicides
committed before June 8, 1977 were deleted from the file. The SHR
contains information about the characteristics of the victim and suspect
(race, sex, age), if known, and the offense (type of weapon used, relation-
ship between victim and offender, number of victims and offenders, fel-
ony circumstances). The information contained in the SHR, however, is
limited for research purposes. It contains no information about the of-
fender if there was no immediate suspect. In addition, other than demo-
graphic characteristics, it provides no detailed knowledge about known
offender's mental capacity, emotional state at the time of the offense,
general emotional-psychological well-being, duress, influence of alcohol
or other drugs, or other similar circumstances. Moreover, it does not
provide sufficiently detailed characteristics of the offense, such as the
brutality of the crime, if torture was involved, if the victim precipitated
the offense in any way, or other factors which could aggravate or miti-
gate the offense. Detailed data of this kind are critical to this and simi-
lar capital punishment research. If cases where the death sentence was
requested or imposed are to be compared to similar cases where it was
not, then an accurate reconstruction of the case must be made. Only by
collecting detailed data can researchers be confident that they are really
comparing similar cases.
In order to construct a more detailed account of both offender and
offense, data were collected from a second source, the original police
46 SOUTH CAROLINA STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, CRIME IN SOUTH CAROLINA
5 (1977-1981).
47 Although the SHR constituted the primary data source it was supplemented by other
data-the police incident and investigation report. If information on the SHR was missing or
incorrect, in most cases it was available in the police reports. Also, since the principal investi-
gator of this project did not rely on SLED to provide the incident reports but got them from
the police agencies themselves, cases that were not reported to SLED and included in the
SHR could be reconstructed and a SHR file made from the police reports. The combination
of SHR and original police report thus assured virtually complete coverage of homicide cases.
The police reports were obtained in some instances by the voluntary cooperation of police
agencies, by Freedom of Information Act requests, or by subpoena in others.
1983]
RAYMOND PA TERNOSTER
incident report and subsequent investigation reports of the homicide.
These reports are kept by local police agencies and include very detailed
accounts of the crime scene and descriptive information on offenders
either known at the time of the offense or discovered through subse-
quent police investigations. These police reports generally include infor-
mation on how the homicide was committed, the precise nature of
injuries received by the victim, any evidence of alcohol or drug use, and
felony or non- felony offenses concurrent with the homicide. The police
investigation report also may note any elements of the offender's motive,
state of mind, or other personal attributes. Incident and investigation
reports were obtained for approximately ninety-five percent of the
homicide cases in the SHR file.
Data were collected from a third source for a subset of the homicide
cases. If a homicide results in an arrest and subsequent indictment, a
record is kept by the State Office of the Attorney General. This record
consists of the docket number of the case; trial data; birth date; name,
sex and race of the offender; judge; outcome of the trial; and sentence
imposed. Indictment and disposition data were collected on all cases of
murder and non-negligent homicide for the years 1977 through 1982. It
was then possible to match the SHR and police incident reports with a
criminal indictment and disposition record, and homicide acts were
coded as to criminal indictment, trial outcome, and sentence disposition.
Although the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty in a
given homicide case is a low visibility process, once that decision is made
a public record is kept. When the prosecutor decides to seek the death
penalty, he or she is required by statute to notify defense counsel of this
intention at least thirty days prior to the date of the trial.48 In addition,
a mandatory administrative procedure requires that a prosecutor seek-
ing the death penalty file a form with the South Carolina Court Admin-
istrator, who then forwards a copy to the state supreme court. The
supreme court staff keeps an updated list of all homicide cases where
death was requested. This information was provided by the supreme
court staff, and cases were coded as either a homicide where death was
requested or was not requested.
B. DATA BASE
Information from the above sources was collected on each of the
1,805 non-negligent homicides committed in South Carolina from June
8, 1977 through December 31, 1981. Although all of these cases involve
homicides, the prosecutor is not free to seek a death sentence in any
given homicide. The new capital punishment statute in South Carolina
48 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
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created a new class of murder-capital murder. A capital murder in-
volves the commission of an act of murder plus at least one of seven
statutory aggravating circumstances.4 9 If at least one of these aggravat-
ing circumstances is not present, the murder is not a capital murder and
the offender is not subject to capital punishment.5 0 Rather than ex-
amine the decision to seek a death sentence using the total pool of all
homicide cases, the analysis will focus primarily on statutorily defined
"death eligible" cases. Of the 1,686 homicides with known offenders
committed in South Carolina between June 8, 1977 and December 31,
1981, 321 (19%) were capital murders. The majority of the data analysis
reported below is restricted to this pool of 321 capital murders.
III. DATA ANALYSIS
This section reports evidence as to the existence of discrimination
and arbitrariness in the decision of the prosecutor in South Carolina to
request the death penalty in a given homicide. If discrimination and
arbitrariness have been purged from the process of capital punishment
under South Carolina's constitutionally approved statute, the decision
to seek the death penalty should be racially neutral and evenly applied
throughout the state. If the prosecutor's decision to seek the death pen-
alty is informed and structured by the same statutory guidelines which
structure sentencer discretion, then it is conceivable that cases where
death is not sought are not "similar in relevant respects" to those where
death is sought.5 If, however, extralegal characteristics of the offense or
49 The South Carolina Code provides:
(I) Murder was committed while in the commission of the following crimes or acts: (a)
rape, (b) assault with intent to ravish, (c) kidnapping, (d) burglary, (e) robbery while
armed with a deadly weapon, () larceny with use of a deadly weapon, (g) housebreak-
ing, and (h) killing by poison and (i) physical torture;
(2) Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for murder;
(3) The offender by his act of murder knowingly created a great risk of death to more
than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or a device which would nor-
mally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose
of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, solicitor, former solicitor, or
other officer of the court during or because of the exercise of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as
an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections em-
ployee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his offical duties.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (C)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
50 Id.
51 A central feature of this analysis and a source of tension in much capital punishment
post-conviction litigation is how the term "similar cases" is to be defined. The Supreme
Court in Greg provides an ambiguous standard- "similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant." 428 U.S. at 204. This proportionality standard arguably suggests a
comparison offactualy similar cases. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The search for
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offender influence the decision to seek death, then homicide cases where
death is not sought which are factually similar to those where it is
sought may be filtered out of the system unnoticed and uncorrected by
appellate review.
A. EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION
A substantial body of prior research has shown consistent evidence
of differential application of the death penalty by race of offender and
race of victim under pre-Furman capital punishment statutes.52 More
recent studies have found that the imposition of death sentences under
post-Furman statutes is also influenced by the race of offender and vic-
tim. 53 Table 1 reports information on another decision-making point in
the capital punishment process-the decision to seek the death penalty.
The upper panel of Table 1 reports the number of homicide acts, death
requests, and the probability of the death penalty being sought by of-
fender/victim racial categories for all homicides where there was a
known offender. When considering the race of the offender alone, little
racial difference exists. In fact, what slight difference that does exist
favors black defendants. The probability of the death penalty being re-
quested for white offenders is .084 (53/634) and .060 (62/1042) for black
offenders (ratio = 1.4 to 1, p >.05). This initial look at the data suggests
no significant racial disparity and is consistent with Kleck's conclusion
in his recent review of racial discrimination in sentencing.
54
When the race of offender and the race of the victim are considered
together, however, a clear pattern of racial disparity emerges. As the
top panel of Table 1 shows, the probability of the prosecutor seeking the
death penalty for black offenders who kill white victims is .365 and for
blacks who kill other blacks it is .009. Black offenders who cross racial
lines are over 40 times more likely to have the death penalty requested
than black killers of blacks. This large differential in the treatment of
similarity should begin with a compilation of cases where the characteristics of the offense and
offender are similar, rather than beginning with a pool of cases which are dispositionally simi-
lar. The result of a failure to begin with factually similar cases may be to hide significant
sources of arbitrariness and discrimination. This is the position adopted throughout this
Article.
52 See MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO (1940); Bowers & Pierce, supra note
27; Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 SOC. FORCES 369 (1949); E.
Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Punishment, 36 Soc. FORCES 165 (1957); G. Johnson, The
Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS (1941); Wolfgang & Riedel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty in
Georgia, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658 (1975); Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion,
and the Death Penalty, 405 ANNALS 119 (1973).
53 See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 27; Radelet, supra note 38; Jacoby & Paternoster, supra
note 40.
54 See generally Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation ofthe
Evidence With Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 783 (1981).
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black homicide offenders is consistent with Bowers' and Pierce's findings
for racial disparity at the sentencing level.5 5 For white offenders, the
difference by race of victim is less glaring and in the opposite direction.
Whites who kill blacks are slightly more likely (1.6 times) to have the
death penalty sought than white killers of whites.
TABLE 1
PROBABILITY OF PROSECUTOR SEEKING THE DEATH PENALTY BY
RACE OF OFFENDER AND VICTIM-FOR ALL HOMICIDES AND
CAPITAL MURDER CASESa ONLY
ALL HOMICIDE CASES
Probability % That are
Offender/Victim Number of Number of of Death Capital
Combination Homicide Acts Death Requests Requests Murders
Black Kills White 148 54 .365 75.0%
White Kills White 580 46 .079 19.5%
Black Kills Black 894 8 .009 8.5%
White Kills Black 54 7 .130 29.6%
CAPITAL MURDER CASES
Probability of
Offender/Victim Number of Number of Death
Combination Capital Murders Death Requests Request
Black Kills White 111 54 .486
White Kills White 113 44b .389
Black Kills Black 76 8 .105
White Kills Black 16 7 .438
a Capital murder cases are the only homicide cases where the death penalty may be sought.
They involve the commission of a willful homicide in conjunction with at least one other
aggravating circumstance as defined by South Carolina's death penalty statute. See supra
note 49.
b Two cases are missing here because neither the SHR nor police incident report could
verify the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. In both cases guilty pleas
were accepted in exchange for a life sentence and the death penalty request could have
been a ploy in plea bargaining negotiations.
As other studies of capital sentencing have shown, the race of the
victim is an important consideration in the prosecutor's decision
whether to seek the death penalty.56 Although the data do show signifi-
cant racial disparity by race of victim, it is not at all clear that this
difference is due to racial discrimination. As Bowers and Pierce made
clear in their earlier work on capital sentencing, any observed racial dif-
55 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 27.
56 See supra note 50.
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ferences in judicial treatment may "be the result of legally relevant dif-
ferences in the kinds of crimes committed by and against blacks and
whites."'5 7 Requests for the death penalty may be more likely in white
victim cases, for example, because they are more likely to involve an
aggravating circumstance, qualifying as capital murder under South
Carolina's capital punishment statute. Such is indeed the case. As the
final column of the top panel of Table 1 shows, 75% of the black of-
fender/white victim homicides are capital murders while only 8% of the
black offender/black victim homicides are capital murders. The greater
probability of the prosecutor seeking a death sentence in the former
cases is at least in part because a greater proportion of black of-
fender/white victim cases are statutorily eligible for the death penalty.
To unambiguously examine the influence of race on the decision to
seek the death penalty, it is necessary to limit the analysis to capital
murders. The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the probability of a
death request being made in capital murder cases by offender/victim
racial combinations. As expected, for every offender/victim racial cate-
gory the probability of a death request is higher than in the correspond-
ing row of the upper panel. Although the race effect is less than that
found for all homicides, substantial racial disparity continues to exist:
blacks who kill whites have over a 4.5 times greater risk of having the
death penalty sought than do black killers of blacks. As before, whites
who kill blacks are only slightly more likely to have the death penalty
requested than whites who kill other whites (.438 vs. .389, ratio = 1.12).
Race of victim appears to be a more important consideration than race
of offender.58 The probability of a death sentence being requested for
killers of whites is .438 and for killers of blacks it is .163, a 2.5 times
greater risk for killers of whites. For white capital murderers, the
probability of the prosecutor seeking the death penalty is .395 and for
black capital murderers the probability is .332, a difference of only 1.19
times. When race of victim is ignored, then, there is an almost equal
chance of the death penalty being requested for white and black
offenders.
These data do not paint a very favorable picture of prosecutorial
discretion in deciding when to seek the death penalty in a capital homi-
cide case. The prosecutor sought the death penalty in only 115 (36%) of
the 321 capital homicides committed in South Carolina between June 8,
1977 and December 31, 1981. The bottom panel of Table 1 suggests
that one of the influences in the decision to seek a death sentence is the
57 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 27, at 597.
58 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 27; Radelet, supra note 38; Jacoby & Paternoster, supra note
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race of the victim. Even if racial disparity exists among capital murder
cases, it could reasonably be argued that not even all capital murders
are equivalent and that white victim capital murders are more aggra-
vated than black victim capital murders.
In order to be categorized as a capital murder, a homicide must
include at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. Yet other ag-
gravating factors that are not expressly defined by statute may influence
the decision to seek a death sentence. Capital murders may differ, then,
in the extent to which non-statutory aggravating circumstances are pres-
ent. Table 2 reports the influence of several possible aggravating cir-
cumstances on the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty. The
first four rows are for comparison and show the effect of victim's race
and offender's race. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the race
of the victim has a significant effect on the decision to seek death while
the race of offender has almost no effect. Table 2 reveals that several
other factors constitute aggravating elements in a homicide and influ-
ence the prosecutor's decision. The number of victims has a significant
impact; multiple murderers are one and a half times more likely to have
the death penalty requested than killers of single victims. The number
of offenders also has a significant effect. Capital murders involving
more than one offender are more likely death penalty homicides than
single offender capital murders. Second in magnitude to the effect of
the victim's race is the relationship between victim and offender. Simi-
lar to Radelet's findings,59 these data show that murders involving
strangers are more likely to be death penalty cases than murders among
acquaintances or primary relations. Sex of victim and type of weapon
used are two other significant influences on the prosecutor's decision;
killers of women and killers using guns are significantly more likely to
have the death penalty sought.
The data in Table 2 reveal several factors which influence the deci-
sion to seek the death penalty in capital murder cases. Although race of
victim shows the greatest differential, it is not the only determinant of
the prosecutor's selection of death penalty cases. The presence of other
significant aggravating circumstances suggests that any observed racial
disparity in the treatment of capital murders may be due to these non-
statutory factors. Table 3 reports the number of capital homicides,
death penalty requests, and probability of the death penalty being re-
quested for black and white victim cases within categories of the
number of victims and the victim-offender relationship. Of the non-
statutory aggravating factors, the number of victims and victim-offender
relationship showed the most significant effect on the decision to seek
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the death penalty (see Table 2). These were dichotomized into multi-
ple/single victims and stranger/non-stranger homicides.
The findings reported in Table 3 show that even when these two
other factors are controlled, there is still considerable disparity by race
of the victim in the decision to request the death penalty. The data
indicate that, in three of the four situations of number of vic-
tims/victim-offender relationship, the probability of a capital murder
being treated as a death penalty case is higher for killers of whites than
for killers of blacks. Only for stranger homicides involving multiple vic-
tims is the probability of a death penalty request greater for black vic-
tim cases, and here there are too few cases (n = 3) to make definitive
conclusions. The remaining categories demonstrate that as the homi-
cide becomes more aggravated, the racial disparity becomes greater
(1.94 for single victim/non-stranger homicides, 2.55 for single vic-
tim/stranger homicides, and .615/0 for multiple victim/non-stranger
homicides).
The data presented thus far show a considerable difference in treat-
ment by race of victim, a difference which cannot be accounted for by
the effect of the number of victims or the victim-offender relationship.
It is still possible, however, that this racial disparity could be due to the
other non-statutory aggravating factors found to significantly influence
the decision to seek the death penalty (see Table 2). Two homicide seri-
ousness scales were constructed in order to fully address this possibility
and provide a more exact test of the discrimination hypothesis. In the
first scale, a score of 1 was assigned for each of the following aggravating
factors: (1) homicide involving strangers, (2) multiple victims, (3) multi-
ple offenders, and (4) female victims. A score of 0 was assigned for the
absence of any factor, creating an aggravation scale ranging in possible
value from 0 (no non-statutory aggravating factors present) to 4 (all four
non-statutory aggravating factors present). A second scale was con-
structed along identical lines with the addition of a fifth aggravating
factor. For this fifth factor a score of 1 was assigned if any of the follow-
ing were present: the offender had a history of violent offenses; the of-
fense involved post-mortem abuse or multiple efforts (i.e. stabbing and
shooting victim); the murder was particularly brutal; there was a con-
current sex offense not including rape; the victim was shot more than
once; the offender tried to bury or hide the body. The second aggrava-
tion scale ranged in value from 0 to 5, with 5 representing the presence
of all five aggravating factors.
Using these homicide aggravation scales, a comparison can be
made of the probability of a death sentence being requested in white
victim and black victim cases at identical levels of homicide aggrava-
tion. Table 4 reports the results. The data show that the aggravation
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scales are reasonably valid indicators of homicide seriousness. Column 3
shows that for both scales there is a consistent increment in the likeli-
hood of a death penalty request at increasing levels of aggravation. The
ratio of probabilities between the highest and lowest aggravation level is
3 to 1 for the first aggravation scale and over 8 to 1 for the second.
Further, there is an increase of at least .50 in adjacent levels of aggrava-
tion for both scales. The data also continue to show strong and consis-
tent evidence of racial disparity in the selection of death cases by the
prosecutor. The upper panel of Table 4 demonstrates that at each ag-
gravation level the probability of the death penalty being requested is
higher for white than black victim cases (compare columns 6 and 9).
On the first aggravation scale, the ratio of white victim to black victim
probabilities ranges from 1.4 to 1 (aggravation level 3) to 10.5 to 1 (ag-
gravation level 2). An identical pattern emerges for the second aggrava-
tion scale. At each of the six different levels there is a greater likelihood
of death being sought for killers of whites than killers of blacks.
Thus, apparently "similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant" are being handled differently by the prosecutor depending
on the race of the victim. The evidence presented thus far of differential
treatment by race of victim is very consistent and is strong enough to
persist once other non-statutory aggravating factors are controlled. Al-
though taken singularly each of these aggravating circumstances cannot
account for the effect of the victim's race on the decision to seek the
death penalty, it is possible that the racial effect may be explained by a
combination of these other factors. A multivariate analysis of the data
was performed to examine this possibility. Usually, when one wishes to
look at the simultaneous effect of several explanatory variables on a de-
pendent variable, multiple regression procedures are employed. Multi-
ple regression cannot be used here, however, because of a dichotomous
dependent variable. A logit analysis was conducted instead.60 Using
logit procedures, an analysis similar to that provided by multiple regres-
sion can be done. Various models to explain the decision to seek the
death penalty can be compared to the data and a goodness-of-fit statistic
(Likelihood Ratio Chi-square), which was calculated to determine
which model provides the best fit to the data. Once an adequate model
60 The logit analyses were done using Goodman's ECTA (Everyman's Contingency Table
Analysis) program. ECTA calculated log-linear fits for hierarchial models for contingency
tables, and estimates the parameters of the model. Although the logit is usually defined as
half of the log of the odds of the expected cell frequencies for the dependent variable, Good-
man's ECTA analyzes the log of the odds. See D. KNOKE & P. BURKE, LOG-LINEAR MODELS
(1980). ECTA estimates lambda coefficients for specified models and logit estimates analo-
gous to multiple regression coefficients may be obtained by doubling the lambda value.
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is found, effect parameters similar to regression coefficients can be
estimated.
Table 5 reports the results of the logit analysis. In the logit equa-
tion the outcome variable is the decision to seek the death penalty and
explanatory variables are the race of the victim, victim-offender rela-
tionship, and the number of victims. These particular explanatory vari-
ables were selected because they showed the greatest effect on the
decision to seek the death penalty in the bivariate analysis (see Table
2) .61 The outcome and independent variables were all dichotomous.
61 The logit analysis reported in Table 5 uses three explanatory variables to explain the
likelihood of a death request: race of victim, victim-offender relationship and the number of
victims. In Table 2 the factors that had significant effects on the probability of the death
penalty being sought and their significance level were: race of victim (p<.001); number of
victims (p<.003); number of offenders (p<.004); victim-offender relationship (p<.002 ); sex of
victims (p<.009); and weapon used (p<.05). Although six variables had a significant effect on
death request, only the three variables showing the greatest difference in ratios and having
the highest levels of significance were selected for the logit procedure. The analysis was done
this way because with four dichotomous variables a 2x2x2x2 way contingency is produced.
Since there were only 321 capital homicides, some of the 16 cells were empty and others had
only a few cases. To compensate for this a constant of.5 was added to every cell as Goodman
recommends. Goodman, The Multi-variate Analysis of Qalitalive Data: Interactions Among Multi-
ple Classifcations, 65 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 226, 229 (1970). Although this is suitable for a
16-cell table, the addition of one other dichotomous explanatory variable produces a 32-cell
table and the number of empty cells increases. Although the adjustment of adding .5 to each
cell could again be made, this has the effect of underestimating the effect parameters and the
significance of those effects.
Despite the conservative nature of this procedure it would still be desirable to simultane-
ously control for another explanatory variable to see if the race effect vanishes. A second logit
analysis was done with four explanatory variables, adding the number of offenders (the factor
with the strongest effect on the probability of a death request of the remaining variables. The
results are virtually unchanged. The model of independence was rejected, suggesting that
some of the independent variables were related to Death Request. A second model fit all the
two-, three-, and four-way effects between the non-statutory aggravating factors and Death
Request. This model, which excluded the two-way effect of Race of Victim on Death Re-
quest, provided an unacceptable fit to the data (X2 = 16.01, 8 df, p<.05). When the two-way
Race of Victim-Death Request effect was fit to the model, the fit to the data improved signifi-
cantly (X2 = 4.11, 7 df, p>.50), which indicates that the Race of Victims has a significant
effect on Death Request. The next model tested which fitted all four two-way effects but no
higher-order interactions is similar to Model 4 in Table 5 with the exception of one more two-
way effect. This two-way effect model provided a good fit (X2 = 5.14, 11 df, p>.50). Al-
though more parsimonious models with fewer two-way effects fit the data well, parameter
estimates were estimated from this full two-way effect model for comparison. As expected,
the parameter estimates from this five-variable model are smaller in magnitude than those
from the four-variable Model 4 of Table 5. The substantive conclusion, however, remains
unchanged. The beta coefficients were all negative, indicating that the odds of the death
penalty being requested for capital murder are reduced for black victims, non-stranger of-
fenders, single victims, and single offenders. Furthermore, the largest beta coefficient was
found for the effect of Race of Victim (B = -. 508). The effect of Race of Victim on Death
Request was over one and a half times that for the Number of Victims (B = -2.86); twice as
large as the effect for Victim-Offender Relationship (B - -. 250); and over three times the
magnitude of the effect for the Number of Offenders (B -. 166). Even after controlling for
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TABLE 5




Model Fitted Marginalsa Ratio X 2  df Probability
1 [RVN] [D] 34.36 7 .000
2 [RVN] [VND] 17.97 4 .001
3 [RVN] [VND] [RD] 3.86 3 .276
4 [RVN] [RD] [VD] [ND] 4.18 4 .382
5 [RVN] [RD] [VD] 8.95 5 .111
6 [RVN] [RD] [ND] 9.11 5 .105
7 [RVN] [RD] 13.14 6 .041
EFFECT PARAMETERSb OF DICHOTOMOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
ON DEATH REQUEST FOR MODEL 4
Variable Logit Estimate
Race of Victim -. 556
Number of Victims -. 356
Victim-Offender Relationship -. 304
a R = Race of Victim; V = Victim-Offender Relationship; N = Number of Victims; D
= Death Requested.
b The effect parameters pertain to the case where the Race of the Victim is Black,
Number of Victims is Single Victim, and Victim-Offender Relationship is Non-
Stranger.
In looking at Table 5, note first that since this is a logit analysis
(i.e., there is a specified outcome variable-Death Request) rather than
a general log-linear analysis, the marginals for the explanatory variables
[RVN] are always fitted. The first model presented in Table 5 is the
model of independence. This model presumes that the outcome varia-
ble is unrelated to all of the explanatory variables. As can be seen, this
model provides a very poor fit to the data (X 2 = 34.36, p<.000) which
suggests that some of the explanatory variables are related to Death Re-
quest. The second model in Table 5 fits the three way marginal of Vic-
tim-Offender Relationship, Number of Victims, and Death Request.
This model includes all the direct effects and interaction effects between
the two non-statutory aggravating factors and the outcome variable.
Race of victim is excluded from this model. By including all direct and
interaction effects for the non-statutory aggravating factors but no ef-
the effect of three other factors, the race of the victim in a capital homicide case still has a
significant effect on whether or not the prosecutor seeks the death penalty.
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fects for race of victim, the aggravating factors are allowed to have their
maximum impact. Nonetheless, Model 2 also provides a very poor fit to
the data (X2 = 17.97, p<.001) and should be rejected. This is an im-
portant finding since it informs us that the outcome variable cannot be
adequately explained without including the omitted explanatory varia-
ble-Race of Victim. Any subsequent model must therefore include the
Race of Victim before it will provide a good fit to the data.
Model 3 confirms this. Model 3 is identical to Model 2 except that
it adds the two-way effect of Race of Victim on Death Request. This
model does provide an adequate fit to the data (X2 = 3.86, p = .276).
Although representing the data well, Model 3 may not be the most par-
simonious model that could fit the data since it contains three two-way
effects-[VD], [ND], [RD]-and one three-way interaction effect-
[VND]. We already know that [RD] cannot be excluded from any
model, and since a three-way effect is less parsimonious than two-way
effects, Models 4 through 6 only fit combinations of two-way effects.
Model 4 fits all two-way effects and provides a very good fit to the data
(X 2 = 4.18, p = .382). Model 5 excludes the term [ND] (the effect of the
Number of Victims on Death Request), and Model 6 drops the term
[VD] (the effect of the Victim-Offender Relationship on Death Re-
quest). Both of these models still fit the data reasonably well in that the
likelihood ratio is non-significant. One may be tempted to conclude
that one of these two two-way effect models is best. In examining the
difference in Likelihood Ratio from Model 4 to Models 5 and 6, how-
ever, the reduction in the Likelihood X2 relative to the loss of a single
degree of freedom is significant. 62 This suggests that the two-way term
[ND] not included in Model 5 and the term [VD] excluded in Model 6
are significant factors in explaining the outcome variable and should
remain in the final model. The most appropriate model for these data,
then, is Model 4 which contains two-way effects between Death Request
and Race of Victim, Victim-Offender Relationship, and Number of
Victims. Model 7 finds that the data cannot be explained by the Race
of Victim alone (X 2 = 13.14, p< .05).
62 In deciding whether or not a particular factor has a significant effect on the outcome
variable, the model with the term fitted is compared to an identical model where it is ex-
cluded. The statistical test is whether the decrease in the likelihood ratio X 2 by adding the
effect to the model is significant relative to the loss of degrees of freedom. For example,
Model 4 in Table 5 fits three two-way effects [RD] [VD] and [ND]. Model 5 excludes the
term [ND]. To determine if [ND] is a significant effect, substract the two X 2 's and degrees of
freedom and apply a regnlar X test: 8.95 - 4.18 = 4.77 (5 df- 4 df= I do. A X 2 of 4.77
with I df is significant at c = .05 and so [ND] significantly improves the fit of the data and
should remain in the model. For the effect of [VD]: 9.11 - 4.18 = 4.93 and it too is signifi-
cant at a = .05 and I df. Thus, both effects are significant and together with [RD] make up
the final model.
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The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the effect parameters from the
logit analysis. These effect parameters correspond to the final model
accepted. It represents the full two-way effect model (Model 4 in the
top panel of Table 5). The logit estimate is interpreted similarly to the
additive coefficients of multiple regression. Positive logit values indicate
that the explanatory variable increases the odds on the outcome varia-
ble, while negative logits indicate that the odds are decreased. The logit
parameters here are negative, indicating that the effect of a black vic-
tim, single victim, and non-stranger offender is to decrease the odds of
having the death penalty requested in a given capital murder. Since the
logit estimates are in the standard form of odds ratios, the relative im-
portance of the explanatory variables may be assessed by comparing the
magnitudes of the betas. Importantly, of the three explanatory vari-
ables, the one with the greatest impact on the odds of a death request is
the Race of the Victim (B = -. 556). This variable has a much greater
direct impact on the outcome variable than either the Number of Vic-
tims (B = -. 356) or the Victim-Offender Relationship (B = -. 304).
This finding is indeed disturbing. It indicates that there are significant
amounts of racial disparity in the prosecutor's decision to seek a death
sentence and that this differential treatment by race cannot be ac-
counted for by type of homicide or several other legally permissible
factors.
B. EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARINESS
In addition to being influenced by a climate of discrimination, post-
Furman capital punishment statutes can fail to comport with the expec-
tations of the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,63Jurek v. Texas64 and
Proftit v. Florida65 by being disparately applied within a state. Since
capital punishment legislation involves the enactment of a state statute, it
should be applied uniformly throughout the state, no matter where the
homicide occurred. The decision to seek the death penalty in South
Carolina is a decision made by the prosecutor in each of the sixteen
judicial circuits within the state. Table 6 reports two sets of results on
the geographical variation of homicides and death requests. The first
set presents the total number of homicides, the number of death re-
quests, and the probability of a death request for all homicides for each
of the sixteen judicial circuits in South Carolina (columns 2, 4 and 5).
The second set reports a similar analysis using only capital murders (col-
umns 3, 4 and 6).
63 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
64 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
65 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
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TABLE 6
NUMBER OF HOMICIDES, NUMBER OF CAPITAL MURDERS, NUMBER
OF DEATH PENALTY REQUESTS AND PROBABILITY OF DEATH
PENALTY BEING REQUESTED BY JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Number Number Probability Probability
Judicial of of Capital of Death for All for Capital
Circuit Homicides Murders Requests Homicides Murders
1 57 9 4 .070 .444
2 66 15 4 .061 .267
3 80 14 6 .075 .428
4 95 12 2 .021 .167
5 132 30 6 .045 .200
6 34 5 2 .059 .400
7 63 10 7 .111 .700
8 62 9 4 .064 .444
9 124 45 11 .089 .244
10 75 5 5 .067 .800
11 43 15 12 .279 .800
12 59 14 4 .068 .286
13 144 30 7 .062 .300
14 47 17 10 .213 .588
15 58 15 13 .224 .867
16 46 16 9 .196 .563
Table 6 indicates that there is considerable variation across the six-
teen judicial circuits in the likelihood of the prosecutor seeking the death
sentence. Considering all homicides (column 5), the probability ranges
from a high of .279 in the Eleventh Circuit to a low of .021 in the Fourth
Circuit. Under the same law a homicide offender can run a 13 times
greater risk of having the death penalty requested if the crime is com-
mitted in the Eleventh rather than the Fourth Circuit. Such variation
in the probability of a death sentence request by the prosecutor may, of
course, simply reflect the geographical distribution of capital murders
throughout the state. Some judicial circuits may have a greater propor-
tion of capital murders than others. A quick look at the probability of a
death sentence request in capital murder homicides (column 6), how-
ever, still shows considerable geographical variation. In some circuits
the prosecutor requests the death penalty in over 50% of the capital
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TABLE 7
NUMBER OF HOMICIDES, NUMBER OF CAPITAL MURDERS, NUMBER
OF DEATH PENALTY REQUESTS AND PROBABILITY OF DEATH
PENALTY BEING REQUESTED FOR URBAN AND RURAL AREAS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Location Number Number Number Probability Probability
of of of Capital of Death for All for Capital
Crime Homicides Murders Requests Homicides Murders
Urbana 400 102 31 .078 .304
Rural 838 169 84 .111 .497
a This area was made up of the fifth, seventh, nineth and thirteen judicial circuits,
which include the SMSA's of Columbia, Spartanburg, Charleston, and Greenville
respectively.
homicide cases (Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and
Sixteenth Circuits), while in other circuits it is sought in less than 30%
(Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Twelfth Circuits).
Given the makeup of South Carolina's judicial circuits, it is possible
to categorize each district as either predominantly urban or rural. The
state's four Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas are found in four
separate judicial circuits. These four circuits were combined to form an
urban geographical area and the remaining twelve circuits were com-
bined to form a rural geographical area. The distribution of death re-
quests by urban and rural area is presented for both all homicides and
capital murders separately in Table 7.
Several striking observations appear. First, similar to Bowers and
Pierce's findings with respect to the imposition of the death penalty,
66
these data indicate that the prosecutor's decision to request a death sen-
tence is significantly more likely in rural than urban areas (probabilities
are .078 for urban and .111 for rural areas for all homicides, p<.05).
Second, also consistent with Bowers' and Pierce's data,6 7 this is true even
though a slightly greater proportion of homicides are capital murders in
urban (26%) than in rural areas (20%). Table 7 shows that the disparity
between the likelihood of a death request persists when only capital
66 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 27, at 606-07.
67 Id.
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TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF URBAN AND RURAL GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS IN THE
PERCENT OF CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASES HAVING NON-STATUTORY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PERCENT OF CAPITAL MURDER HAVING:
Location White Stranger Multiple Multiple Female Gun
of Crime: Victims Victims Victims Offenders Victims Homicides
Urban 65% 63% 18% 53% 27% 31%
Rural 76% 65% 14% 60% 23% 27%
murders are examined (column 6). The types of homicides in rural and
urban areas, therefore, cannot account for the observed differential
treatment.
As was the case with the race differential, any observed geographi-
cal variation in the prosecutorial handling of homicides may be due to
the effects of non-statutory aggravating circumstances of the crime. Ta-
ble 8 provides some information on the characteristics of urban and ru-
ral homicides and shows that rural capital murders are not substantially
more aggravated than urban capital homicides. Although rural capital
murders are slightly more likely to involve multiple victims, female vic-
tims, and victims of gun offenses, they are less likely to be characterized
by other important aggravating factors such as stranger offenders and
multiple offenders. Furthermore, an urban-rural differential remains
when the aggravating factors characteristic of rural homicides are con-
trolled. Table 9 shows that, in every case where these aggravating fac-
tors are controlled, there is a greater likelihood of a capital murder been
treated as a death penalty case in rural than in urban areas. It would
appear, then, that the documented differences in the prosecutor's deci-
sion to seek the death penalty by the location of the crime in the state
cannot be accounted for by the characteristics of the crimes being com-
mitted in rural and urban areas.
The greatest difference between rural and urban capital murders is
that rural murders are more likely to involve white victims than urban
murders (76% vs. 65%, see Table 8). Table 9 examines the joint distri-
bution of the geographical location of the crime and race of victim (col-
umn 5). A differential treatment by race exists in both urban and rural
areas with racial disparity much greater in urban (ratio of probabilities
= .439/.056 = 7.8 to 1) than in rural areas (ratio of probabilities =
.539/.317 = 1.7 to 1). Table 9 also indicates that the greatest variation
in the likelihood of a death sentence request is produced by race of vic-
tim characteristics than any of the non-statutory aggravating circum-
1983]






















RACE OF VICTIM AND LOCATION OF CRIM E
TABLE 10
PROBABILITY OF PROSECUTOR SEEKING THE DEATH PENALTY FOR
CAPITAL MURDER BY RACE OF VICTIM/OFFENDER AND
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Location Black Kills White Kills Black Kills White Kills
of Crime: White (N) White (N) Black (N) Black (N)
Urban .364 (33) .531 (32) .057 (35) - (0)
Rural .636 (66) .443 (61) .200 (30) .636 (11)
stances. If the ratio of highest to lowest death penalty request
probabilities is calculated for each factor in Table 9, the variation by
number of victims is 2.3 to 1 (.667/.284); for victim-offender relation-
ship, it is 2.8 to 1 (.588/.212); for sex of victim 2.3 to 1 (.600/.262); for
type of weapon, 4.6 to 1 (.509/.111) and for race of victim, the variation
produced is 9.6 to 1 (.539/.056).
Table 10 reports death request probabilities by geographical area
for combinations of race of offender/race of victim. The data show a
striking variation in the probability of the prosecutor seeking the death
penalty. Except for white killers of whites, the probability of a death
request is consistently greater in rural than urban areas. Similar to
Bowers' and Pierce's findings on death sentencing,68 the effects of race of
victim and geographical area operate independently of one another to
produce glaring disparities in the likelihood of a death request. For ex-
ample, a black offender who kills a white victim in a rural area of the
state has an eleven times greater risk of having the death penalty re-
quested than a black who kills a black victim in an urban area. This is
true even though both offenses are capital murders subject to the same
state statute!
IV. CONCLUSION
The intention of the Supreme Court Justices in Greg,Jurek and
Pro ftill was clear: unbridled discretion in the application of capital pun-
ishment could be restricted by the articulation of sentencing standards.
These standards would not only structure the decision of juries and
judges to impose a death sentence but also the prosecutor's decision to
seek the death penalty. The Court also expected appellate review to act
as a supervisor of the capital punishment process, correcting legal and
constitutional errors and curbing the influence of discrimination and ar-
68 Id. at 605.
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bitrariness. The managerial role of appellate review was made clear by
the Court's ruling striking down capital punishment schemes that did
not promise "meaningful appellate review."
In order to ensure meaningful review, however, appellate courts
must monitor the full range of death penalty cases. This would include
all "death eligible" cases, cases in which the death penalty was actually
imposed, cases where it was requested but not imposed, and cases where
it was not requested. If there is a systematic filtering out of cases, influ-
enced by discriminatory attitudes of judges, juries or prosecutors, then
appellate review holds little promise of correcting constitutional
infirmities.
The data presented in this Article present a troubling picture of the
post-Furman capital punishment statute in one death penalty state,
South Carolina. It indicates that the prosecutor's decision to seek the
death penalty is significantly related to the race of the victim. This dif-
ferential treatment by race cannot be accounted for by the type of homi-
cide committed or other possible aggravating factors. In fact, of several
explanatory variables, the victim's race is the most important predictor
of the prosecutor's decision. In addition to and independent of this ra-
cial disparity was a variation in the likelihood of a death request by
geographical region. There was considerable variation in the
probability of death being requested by local prosecutors across the six-
teen judicial circuits in the state. When these sixteen circuits were reclas-
sified into rural and urban geographical areas, we found substantially
more death requests in rural than urban areas, even though a greater
proportion of urban homicides were "death eligible" (capital murders).
This geographical variation was found to persist even when some aggra-
vating differences between urban and rural murders were controlled.
Although several factors were included as controls in the analysis,
several other important considerations were not. Two of the most im-
portant are the criminal history of the defendant and the legal strength
of the case. Although it is traditional to hedge one's conclusions with
these research limitations as a backdrop, the possible role these excluded
factors may play should be outlined. Before the results presented here
can be attributed to excluded factors, these variables must, of course, be
related to the variables under consideration. This suggests that killers of
whites and rural killers should have more extensive criminal records
than killers of blacks or murderers in urban areas. There is no reason to
presume that those offenders who kill white victims have more extensive
and/or more violent criminal histories than killers of blacks. Even if it is
presumed that black offenders have more extensive criminal histories
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than whites,69 this cannot account for the finding regarding the greater
likelihood of death penalty requests in white victim cases since, in this
data, white capital murder victims are equally likely to be killed by
white as by black offenders and black victims are more likely to be killed
by black offenders. Nor is there any more reason to expect rural capital
murderers to have more extensive violent criminal histories than urban
murderers; in fact, given the opportunity and the distribution of of-
fenses, offenders in urban areas may be more criminal than their rural
counterparts.
Although the sufficiency of the evidence is surely a consideration in
the prosecutor's mind in deciding to seek the death penalty since an
aggravating circumstance must also be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, those factors that make for a convincing case are probably ra-
cially neutral. Although it may be argued that the crowded dockets in
urban courts and experience of urban defense counsel make the urban
prosecutor less willing to seek the death penalty than in rural areas, this
may be counteracted by the experience of urban prosecutors and the
resources at their disposal to put together a convincing case. Even if
there is some variation in the legal sufficiency of white victim/black vic-
tim or rural/urban cases, it must be powerful enough to overcome the
substantial racial and geographical variation observed here.
Thus, it should be clear that both race of victim and location of
crime are independent influences on the prosecutor's decision to seek the
death penalty in South Carolina. These findings have greater general-
ity, however, since the South Carolina capital statute was modeled after
the Georgia statute approved in Gregg. Other states have adopted simi-
larly structured guided discretion statutes and there is little reason to
doubt that the discrimination and arbitrariness in the capital punish-
ment process observed here can be found in other states as well. At this
low visibility decision point, cases which may be factually similar are
being treated as death cases or non-death cases depending upon the race
of the victim and the location in the state where the homicide occurred.
Unless the review process extends its scrutiny to the far greater number
of cases where the death penalty could have been sought but was not,
there is little hope for "meaningful appellate review," and such statutes
should face the same constitutional fate as those found by the Court in
Woodson and Roberts.
69 Mulvihill, Tumin & Curtis, A StaffReport Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1969); M. WOLFGANG & F. FERRACUTI,
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